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Interest Follows Principal:  
Why North Carolina Should Pay Interest 
on Unclaimed Personal Property 
 
JOHN V. ORTH* 
 
“[I]nterest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the body . . . .” 
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke (1749)1 
INTRODUCTION 
If the owner of a fee simple estate in land dies without a valid will or 
qualified heirs,2 the estate ends and the real property escheats to the state.3  
The situation with respect to personal property is different. Unclaimed 
personal property is also taken by the state, but unlike escheated real property, 
the state does not necessarily take title.4  Under the North Carolina Unclaimed 
Property Act,5 personal property that is “unclaimed” is “presumed abandoned.”6  In 
that case, the state treasurer takes “custody”7 of the unclaimed property and 
 
 * William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of 
Law.  A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University. 
 1. Beckford v. Tobin (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 1049, 1051; 1 Ves. Sen. 308, 310. 
 2. The North Carolina Intestate Succession Act limits inheritance to decedents’ 
grandparents and their descendants.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15 (2013).  For an article that 
questions the limitations on inheritance by more remote collaterals, see John V. Orth, “The 
Laughing Heir”: What’s So Funny?, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 321 (2013). 
 3. 1 JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR. ET AL., WEBSTER’S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 
§ 4.10, at 4-13 to -14 (6th ed. 2014) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-2). 
 4. Personal property may be unclaimed because the last owner died without a valid will or 
qualified heirs.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-2.  In that case, as with escheated real property, title to 
the property passes to the state.  See id.; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*298–99 (explaining that ownership of “bona vacantia, or goods in which no one else can claim 
a property. . . . should be annexed to the supreme power by the positive laws of the state”).  But 
personal property may also be unclaimed because the owner left it with a holder and has not 
communicated with the holder for a significant period of time.  In that case, the state takes 
custody rather than title.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-52(11), -53, -56, -63(b). 
 5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-51 to -80.  “Property,” as defined by the statute, includes all 
types of tangible and intangible personal property, but does not include interests in real 
property.  Id. § 116B-52(11). 
 6. Id. §§ 116B-53(a), (c). 
 7. Id. §§ 116B-56(a), -63(b). 
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holds it until the owner reclaims the property.8  Although the treasurer will 
return the property to the owner upon proof of title, the state retains the 
interest that accrued while the property was in the treasurer’s custody.9 
In 2008, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Rowlette v. State10 
that the state’s retention of interest pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Act is 
not an unconstitutional taking.11  The court reasoned that the proximate cause 
of the owners’ loss is not the state’s action, but rather, it is a result of the 
owners’ “neglect.”12  In 2013, in Cerajeski v. Zoeller,13 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a thoughtful opinion by Judge 
Richard Posner, rejected that argument and held that a similar provision in 
Indiana’s unclaimed-property act14 was unconstitutional.15 
This Article reviews the North Carolina Unclaimed Property Act, 
compares the reasoning in the Rowlette and Cerajeski cases, and concludes 
that it is time for North Carolina to recognize that the state should account for 
interest earned by unclaimed personal property. 
 
 8. Id. § 116B-67. 
 9. Id. §§ 116B-64, -67(b).  “[W]hen property is delivered or paid to the Treasurer, the 
Treasurer shall hold the property without liability for income or gain.”  Id. § 116B-64.  
Escheated real property and unclaimed personal property are transferred to the Escheat Fund.  
See id. § 116B-5.  The income from the Escheat Fund is used for grants and loans to state 
residents “enrolled in public institutions of higher education” within the state.  Id. § 116B-7(a).  
The North Carolina constitution also provides: 
All property that, after June 30, 1971, shall accrue to the State from escheats, 
unclaimed dividends, or distributive shares of the estates of deceased persons shall be 
used to aid worthy and needy students who are residents of this State and are enrolled 
in public institutions of higher education in this State. 
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 10(2).  Prior to July 1, 1971, escheated property was “appropriated to the 
use of The University of North Carolina.”  Id. § 10(1); see also JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN 
NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 10, 12, 33, 183 (2d ed. 2013) (describing 
the history of escheats in North Carolina). 
 10. Rowlette v. State, 656 S.E.2d 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 11. Id. at 625–26 (quoting and relying on Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982)). 
 12. Id. at 626 (“[S]ince it is the owner’s neglect that results in the State’s possession of the 
property, the capture of interest accruing on that property by the State is not a taking, and the 
State is not required to pay the owner ‘just compensation.’”). 
 13. Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 14. IND. CODE § 32-34-1-30(b) (2014 Supp.) (“[T]he owner is not entitled to receive 
dividends, interest, or other increments accruing after delivery of the property to the attorney 
general under this chapter . . . .”). 
 15. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 583. 
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I. THE NORTH CAROLINA UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT 
The North Carolina Unclaimed Property Act provides a comprehensive 
plan for identifying personal property that is deemed “unclaimed,” for its 
transfer to the state treasurer’s custody, and for its eventual return to the owner 
upon proof of ownership.16  Personal property that is deposited or left with a 
holder17 is “unclaimed” and “presumed abandoned” under the act if the owner 
has not communicated with the holder for a certain period of time, varying 
from one to fifteen years, depending on the type of property.18  Unpaid wages 
and uncollected deposits held by a public utility company, for example, are 
“unclaimed” after one year,19 while uncashed dividend checks are unclaimed 
after three years,20 inactive bank accounts after five years,21 and uncashed 
traveler’s checks after fifteen years.22  A holder of unclaimed property valued 
at fifty dollars or more is required to send to the owner’s last known address a 
written notice that the property will soon be turned over to the state.23  Unless 
the owner then communicates with the holder, the holder must file a report24 
and deliver the property to the treasurer,25 who takes “custody” of the 
 
 16. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-53(a), (c), -56(a), -63(b), -67 (2013).  The North 
Carolina Unclaimed Property Act is based on the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, but differs 
from the uniform act in significant ways.  See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT, 8C U.L.A. 114 
(2014) (“While the North Carolina act is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the 
Uniform Act, it departs from the official text in such manner that the various instances of 
substitution, omission and additional matter cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes.”). 
 17. Money that is deposited in a bank account is technically no longer the property of the 
depositor; rather, the depositor becomes a creditor of the bank to the extent of the balance in the 
account.  See Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 579.  Nonetheless, this Article will follow the usage in the 
Unclaimed Property Act and refer to the balance as the depositor’s “property.”  See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 116B-52(11) (“The term [‘property’] includes property that is referred to as or 
evidenced by . . . [m]oney, a check, draft, deposit, interest, or dividend . . . .”). 
 18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-53(a), (c).  These periods are unaffected by the statute of 
limitations.  Id. § 116B-71(a).  Section 116B-71(a) states: 
The expiration, before or after the effective date of this Article, of a period of 
limitation on the owner’s right to receive or recover property . . . does not preclude 
the property from being presumed abandoned or affect a duty of a holder to file a 
report or to pay or deliver or transfer property to the Treasurer as required by this 
Article. 
Id. 
 19. Id. §§ 116B-53(c)(13)–(14). 
 20. Id. § 116B-53(c)(5). 
 21. Id. § 116B-53(c)(6). 
 22. Id. § 116B-53(c)(1). 
 23. Id. § 116B-59(b). 
 24. See id. §§ 116B-53(a), 160(a). 
 25. Id. § 116B-61(a).  A holder who willfully fails to report or deliver unclaimed property 
to the treasurer is subject to a civil penalty of $1000 a day, up to a maximum of $25,000, plus 
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property.26  Further, “[i]f the property is interest-bearing or pays dividends, the 
interest or dividends” must continue to be paid until the property is turned 
over.27  The fact that the interest or dividends accruing to the property are not 
held by the holder for the period prescribed by the act does not negate the 
presumption that they are also abandoned.28  In this case, interest follows 
principal. 
After taking custody of unclaimed property, the treasurer must deliver an 
annual report to the Administrative Office of the Courts listing the unclaimed 
property, which the office then distributes to the clerks of superior court for 
each county, who must make the list available for public inspection.29  
Although the treasurer has mere custody of the property, the act empowers the 
treasurer to sell the property and pass good title to the purchaser.30  If a 
claimant offers satisfactory proof of ownership, the treasurer delivers the 
nominal value of the property as of the time it was turned over by the holder,31 
but does not include interest earned on the property while in the treasurer’s 
custody.32  According to the act, the treasurer holds unclaimed “property 
 
25% of the value of the property that should have been reported and delivered.  Id. 
§ 116B-77(b). 
 26. See id. § 116B-56 (“Rules for Taking Custody”). 
 27. Id. § 116B-64. 
 28. See id. § 116B-53(d) (“At the time that an interest in property is presumed 
abandoned . . . any other property right accrued or accruing to the owner as a result of the 
interest, and not previously presumed abandoned, is also presumed abandoned.”). 
 29. Id. §§ 116B-62(a), (b), (d).  At one time, this was the principal means by which owners 
or their successors in interest learned that the treasurer had custody of their property; today, the 
website of the National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators provides a more 
convenient way to discover this information.  See NAT’L ASS’N UNCLAIMED PROP. 
ADMINISTRATORS, http://www.naupa.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
 30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-65(c) (“A purchaser of property at a sale conducted by the 
Treasurer pursuant to this Chapter takes the property free of all claims of the owner or previous 
holder and of all persons claiming through or under them.”); see also id. § 116B-65(a).  
Ordinarily, a mere custodian of property cannot convey good title.  See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, 
THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 76, at 269 (2d ed. 1955).  Brown states: 
Where the owner of goods places them in the actual physical control of another but 
does not intend to relinquish the right, as distinct from the power of dominion over 
them, there is no bailment or possession but only a mere custody.  The handing over 
of goods to a customer in a store to examine in the presence of the clerk is a good 
example. 
Id.  Even in the case of a bailment, sale by a bailee to a good-faith purchaser is effective to 
convey the owner’s title only if “the owner by his words or conduct has expressly or impliedly 
represented that the possessor of the goods is either the owner thereof, or has authority to sell 
the same.”  See id. § 71, at 240–41. 
 31. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-67(a), (b), (d). 
 32. Id. § 116B-64. 
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without liability for income or gain.”33  In other words, after the state takes 
possession of the property, interest no longer follows principal. 
II. ROWLETTE V. STATE 
In Rowlette v. State,34 Kevin Patrick Rowlette and three other named 
plaintiffs owned property that was delivered to the North Carolina treasurer as 
“unclaimed.”35  The exact nature and amount of the plaintiffs’ property and 
the date on which it passed into the custody of the treasurer do not appear in 
the report, nor is the plaintiffs’ failure to communicate with the holder within 
the requisite period explained.  While in the custody of the state, Rowlette’s 
property allegedly had earned dividends of $236.36  The other plaintiffs 
alleged that the state held “funds” of theirs—presumably accrued interest—in 
the amounts of $118.20, $71.95, and $84.01.37  Having proved their ownership 
of the property to the satisfaction of the treasurer, the plaintiffs received the 
original value of the property, but not the dividends and interest that it had 
produced.38 
The plaintiffs claimed that the treasurer’s retention of the dividends and 
interest was an unconstitutional taking under both the state and federal 
constitutions.39 Stressing the presumption that state legislation is constitutional 
“unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears 
beyond a reasonable doubt,”40 the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claim.   
Citing several United States Supreme Court cases, the court of appeals 
relied principally on Texaco, Inc. v. Short,41 which upheld the constitutionality 
of Indiana’s Mineral Lapse Act.42  That statute provided that a severed mineral 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Rowlette v. State, 656 S.E.2d 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 35. Id. at 620. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  The plaintiffs alleged that the treasurer violated article I, section 19, of the North 
Carolina constitution, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.  Although the North Carolina constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, 
does not expressly prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just 
compensation, state courts have always regarded such a taking as violative of the North 
Carolina constitution’s “law of the land” clause.  See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 9, at 70 
(quoting Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 445, 449 (1874)). 
 40. Rowlette, 656 S.E.2d at 621, 626 (quoting Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 41. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
 42. Rowlette, 656 S.E.2d at 624, 626 (citing Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518, 530). 
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interest that is unused for twenty years automatically lapses and reverts to the 
current surface owner, unless the mineral owner filed a timely statement of 
claim in the registry of deeds.43  Quoting Texaco, the court of appeals noted 
that “[t]he Supreme Court ‘has never required the State to compensate [an] 
owner for the consequences of his own neglect.’”44 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also relied on decisions of appellate 
courts in Pennsylvania,45 Indiana,46 Louisiana,47 and Ohio48 that upheld the 
retention of interest on unclaimed property.49  Although the court of appeals 
recognized that the Ohio Supreme Court had allowed an appeal from the Ohio 
Court of Appeals,50 the decision in Rowlette was filed before the Ohio 
Supreme Court issued its decision, which reversed the lower court and held 
that the retention of interest is an unconstitutional taking.51 
III. CERAJESKI V. ZOELLER 
In Cerajeski v. Zoeller,52 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act53 was 
unconstitutional to the extent that it denied the plaintiff’s claim for the interest 
 
 43. See IND. CODE § 32-5-11-1 (2014 Supp.). 
 44. Rowlette, 656 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530); see also id. at 626. 
 45. See Smolow v. Hafer, 867 A.2d 767, 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (citing Texaco, 454 
U.S. at 530) (holding that the state treasurer was not required to pay interest on property held on 
behalf of the plaintiff), aff’d, 959 A.2d 298 (Pa. 2008). 
 46. Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 47. Hooks v. Treasurer, 961 So. 2d 425, 432–33 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 48. Sogg v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, No. 06AP-883, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2829, 
at *15, *28–29 (Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Sogg v. Zurz, 905 N.E.2d 187 
(Ohio 2009). 
 49. Rowlette, 656 S.E.2d at 624–26. 
 50. Id. at 625. 
 51. See Sogg, 905 N.E.2d at 192–93.  Not cited in Rowlette was an Illinois Supreme Court 
decision, Canel v. Topinka, 818 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. 2004), which held that the retention of 
dividends earned on unclaimed property in the state’s custody constitutes an unconstitutional 
taking.  See id. at 325  (“At all times the shares of stock remained the private property of 
plaintiff.  Under the circumstances, the dividends, as an incident of ownership, were also private 
property.”). 
 52. Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 53. IND. CODE §§ 32-34-1-1 to -52 (2014 Supp.).  Like the North Carolina act, the Indiana 
act is based on the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, but differs from the uniform act in 
significant ways.  See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT, 8C U.L.A. 109 (2014) (“While the Indiana 
act is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the Uniform Act, it departs from the 
official text in such manner that the various instances of substitution, omission and additional 
matter cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes.”). 
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earned on his property while in the state’s custody.54  The plaintiff, Walter 
Cerajeski, had an interest-bearing account in an Indiana bank with a balance 
of less than fifty dollars that had been inactive for three years when it was 
transferred in 2006 to the custody of the state’s attorney general as unclaimed 
property.55  Like the North Carolina Unclaimed Property Act, the Indiana 
statute does not require individualized notice to an owner of a transfer to the 
state for property valued under fifty dollars,56 and the guardian for the disabled 
Cerajeski did not learn of the account until 2011.57  Recognizing that upon 
proof of ownership, the Indiana Attorney General would return only the 
nominal value of the account as of 2006, Cerajeski’s guardian filed suit in 
federal district court seeking a declaration that she was entitled, on behalf of 
her ward, to the interest accrued on the balance while it was in the attorney 
general’s custody.58  The claim was dismissed by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,59 but on appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the judgment was reversed and the 
case was remanded for determination of the amount of interest belonging to 
Cerajeski.60 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion was authored by Judge Richard Posner, 
long a leader in the field of law and economics.61  Judge Posner began his 
analysis with the proposition that without an identified owner, “the value of 
 
 54. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 583; see also IND. CODE § 32-34-1-30(b) (“[T]he owner is not 
entitled to receive dividends, interest, or other increments accruing after delivery of the property 
to the attorney general under this chapter . . . .”). 
 55. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 579.  Under the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act, inactive bank 
accounts are treated as unclaimed after three years, rather than five years, as in North Carolina.  
Compare IND. CODE § 32-34-1-20(c)(12), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-53(c)(6) (2013).  In 
addition, the Indiana attorney general, rather than the state treasurer, as in North Carolina, is the 
custodian of unclaimed property.  Compare IND. CODE § 32-34-1-27(a), with N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 116B-61(a). 
 56. Compare IND. CODE § 32-34-1-26(e)(3), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-59(b). 
 57. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 579 (noting that neither the nature of Cerajeski’s disability nor 
the date of his guardian’s appointment appears in the report). 
 58. Id. (“Correctly believing that the state wouldn’t pay interest if [Cerejeski’s guardian] 
filed a claim, she filed this lawsuit instead, seeking a declaration that she is entitled (on behalf 
of her ward) to the interest . . . .”).  The plaintiff’s belief was presumably based on the fact that 
IND. CODE § 32-34-1-29 had been held constitutional in Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219, 225 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 59. Schunn v. Zoeller, No. 1:11-cv-1705-JMS-DKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160119 (S.D. 
Ind. Nov. 8, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d 577. 
 60. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 583.  The appellate court assumed that after a declaration of 
Cerajeski’s right in the interest, a claim to the state attorney general would follow.  Id. at 579. 
 61. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 1125 (8th ed. 2013) (describing Judge Posner as “the principal 
practitioner” of the study of law and economics). 
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property is not being maximized.”62  He noted that Indiana law addresses this 
problem in two ways.  First, the state takes title to unclaimed personal 
property after twenty-five years by “escheat.”63  Second, the state takes 
custody of unclaimed personal property after a much shorter period under the 
Indiana Unclaimed Property Act—in the case of bank accounts, after three 
years.64  The reason for taking custody under the act, according to Posner, is 
twofold: to return the property to the stream of commerce and to prevent the 
appropriation of unclaimed property by the present holder.65 
Posner held that Indiana’s “confiscation of the interest on Cerajeski’s 
principal was . . . a taking of a part of his property.”66  He explained, “if you 
own a deposit account that pays interest, you own the interest.”67  Writing for 
the Seventh Circuit panel, which included Judge Frank Easterbrook, who is 
also noted for his use of economic analysis of law,68 Posner wrote: 
We think we know what has led the state into error.  It is its misunderstanding 
of the concept of abandonment, a misunderstanding fostered by the misleading 
term “presumed abandoned” in the Unclaimed Property Act.  Abandonment of 
property other than as a consequence of death without a valid will or heirs 
means at common law a voluntary relinquishment of ownership.69 
Cerajeski never voluntarily relinquished either the principal in his 
account or the interest that it was earning.70  The court rejected the state’s 
position that the principal would escheat in twenty-five years, but the interest 
 
 62. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 579.  Actually, the money deposited with the bank became the 
property of the bank and was used as part of its capital.  See id.  The identity of the depositor—
the bank’s creditor with respect to the amount of the deposit—was also known, but the statute 
deemed the deposit contract “unclaimed” and “presumed abandoned,” and required the bank to 
pay the balance over to the state’s custody.  Id. (citing IND. CODE §§ 32-34-1-17(b), -20(c)). 
 63. Id. at 578 (citing IND. CODE § 32-34-1-36).  Although commonly called “escheat,” title 
to personal property does not technically escheat; rather, the state takes title by a form of 
adverse possession.  See Adverse Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining adverse possession as “[t]he enjoyment of real property with a claim of right when 
that enjoyment is opposed to another person’s claim and is continuous, exclusive, hostile, open, 
and notorious”). 
 64. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 579 (citing IND. CODE § 32-34-1-20(c)). 
 65. See id. at 583 (first citing La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. Tarver, 635 So. 2d 1090, 
1092 (La. 1994); then citing Unclaimed Property Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Unclaimed%20Property%20Act (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015)). 
 66. Id. at 580. 
 67. Id. (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003)). 
 68. Easterbrook co-authored The Economic Structure of Corporate Law with Daniel R. 
Fischel.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
 69. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 582. 
 70. Id. at 581. 
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in only three, pointing out that unclaimed property acts “are not escheat 
statutes.”71  In addition, the court explained:  
There is no articulated basis for fixing a 25-year term for escheat of principal 
and only 3 years for escheat of interest—a period so short as to present a 
serious question whether it is consistent with the requirement in the 
Fourteenth Amendment that property not be taken without due process of 
law.72   
Posner admitted that “[t]he state can charge a fee for custodianship and 
for searching for the owner, but the interest on the principal in a bank account 
is not a fee for those services.”73 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Without the North Carolina Unclaimed Property Act, interest on deposit 
accounts and dividends on securities would continue to accumulate for the 
benefit of the owner.  The statutory requirement that the property be 
transferred to the state’s custody is what stops the owner’s beneficial 
accumulation.  While the transfer to the state protects the owner from 
misappropriation by the holder,74 that protection does not have to be 
purchased with the loss of the owner’s subsequent gains.  The Uniform 
Unclaimed Property Act, for instance, on which the North Carolina act is 
largely based, requires the custodian to account for interest for up to ten years 
at the lesser of the legal rate of interest or the rate paid while the property was 
in the possession of the holder.75  In addition, the state’s failure to account for 
interest actually diminishes the value of the owner’s principal, since the 
 
 71. See id. at 580–81 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Vega, 174 F.3d 870, 872 (7th 
Cir. 1999)).  Posner notes: 
[T]he unclaimed-property acts enacted by Illinois and other states, including acts 
based on the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1995, as the Indiana act is, “are not 
escheat statutes.  The state does not acquire title to the property.  It is merely a 
custodian.  The owner can reclaim his property at any time.” 
Id. (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co., 174 F.3d at 872). 
 72. Id. at 582.  The question would be one of substantive due process.  See JOHN V. ORTH, 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 51–72 (2003). 
 73. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 583. 
 74. See id. (noting that unclaimed-property acts protect property owners against “lucrative 
silence” by the holder). 
 75. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 11 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995).  The drafters of the 
uniform act do not explain their rationale for terminating the state’s obligation to account for 
interest after ten years, while otherwise maintaining that “[t]he owner’s rights are never cut off; 
under this Act, the owner’s rights exist in perpetuity.”  Id. § 16 cmt. 
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economic function of interest is, in part, to compensate the owner for the 
principal’s loss of value due to inflation.76 
While the state’s retention of interest is a loss to the owner, it is a gain to 
the state; interest on unclaimed property is a source of revenue and is treated 
as such by the state.77  The state may be entitled to compensation for the cost 
of collecting and safeguarding unclaimed property, but there is no reason to 
assume that the amount of lost interest is proportional to the cost of state 
services.  The Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, in a section not included in 
the North Carolina act, allows retention of reasonable charges and other fees 
for custodianship.78  It is unclear why the statutory drafters considered it 
necessary to label property as “unclaimed” and “presumed abandoned” to 
justify the state’s taking of the property into its safekeeping after a period of 
inactivity.  The doctrine of parens patriae, by which the state protects those 
unable to protect themselves, would seem sufficient justification.79  Rather, as 
Judge Posner pointed out in Cerajeski, the labels have proved to be a source of 
confusion.80  Abandonment is a means of terminating title to personalty,81 but 
abandonment requires more than a surrender of dominion and control.  As the 
North Carolina Supreme Court explained in State v. West,82 which involved 
official documents that were missing for over 200 years: 
 
 
 76. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 619 (9th 
ed. 2013) (defining “inflation risk” as the risk that the rate of inflation will exceed the interest 
rate, causing the real value of the principal to decline). 
 77. See, e.g., Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 390 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“Although ‘[t]he practical reason behind the states’ action is to prevent unclaimed personal 
property being eventually appropriated by the present holder,’ the state being ‘better able to 
provide long-term . . . custody’ of the property, ‘it is sometimes admitted that the statutes are 
also a means of raising revenue.’” (alteration in original) (quoting John V. Orth, Escheat: Is the 
State the Last Heir?, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 73, 78–79 (2009))), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 
(2013); La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. McNamara, 561 So. 2d 712, 716 (La. 1990) 
(describing “the primary rationale” for the unclaimed-property acts as “revenue raising”). 
 78. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 13(b). 
 79. Compare the power of state attorneys general to enforce the terms of charitable trusts.  
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 76, at 768 (“Under traditional law . . . , the state attorney 
general, as parens patriae, has primary responsibility for enforcing charitable trusts.”).  Today, 
the North Carolina Attorney General shares the responsibility with “[t]he settlor . . . the district 
attorney, a beneficiary, or any other interested party.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-4-405.1 (2013). 
 80. Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 81. 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.20[2], at 34-183 to -184 
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2008).  Powell states that “[o]wnership of estates in land cannot be 
lost by abandonment at common law, even when originally acquired by adverse possession.  
The opposite doctrine would violate the Statute of Frauds.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 82. State v. West, 235 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 1977). 
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[A]n essential element of abandonment is the intent of the owner to relinquish 
the article permanently.  “An abandonment must be made to appear 
affirmatively by the party relying thereon and the burden is upon him who sets 
up abandonment to prove it by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence.” 
  It is the owner who must have the intent so to terminate his title.  Thus, it 
is not enough that the custodian into whose hands the owner entrusted it 
intentionally discarded it.83 
As shown in West, the mere passage of time, even of centuries, is not 
conclusive evidence of an intent to abandon. 
There are probably many reasons why owners allow their deposit 
accounts and other property to remain inactive for significant periods, but not 
all owners do so simply out of “neglect.”84  In Cerajeski, for example, the 
depositor’s inactivity was apparently caused by his disability.85 
Cerajeski also illustrates another reason for concern with the Unclaimed 
Property Act: because the balance in Walter Cerajeski’s account was less than 
fifty dollars, the Indiana act did not require the bank to send him any notice 
that his property was about to be delivered to the state and would cease 
accruing interest.86  Small depositors in North Carolina are given no more 
protection87—only those with larger balances must be sent written notice.88 
CONCLUSION 
It is time for North Carolina to pay interest on unclaimed property in its 
custody. In many cases, as with the Rowlette plaintiffs, the property 
transferred to the state was producing dividends or interest for the benefit of 
 
 83. Id. at 157 (quoting 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 36 
(1962)); see also DAVID HOWARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE MISADVENTURES OF A STOLEN AMERICAN 
RELIC 1–11 (2010) (describing North Carolina’s recovery of its original copy of the Bill of Rights, 
missing since 1865). 
 84. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1981) (“[T]his Court has never required the 
State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect.”). 
 85. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 579 (“[W]e assume the reason for [Cerajeski’s] failure to 
indicate any interest in the account for the required three years was related to whatever 
disability led to the appointment of a guardian for his affairs, but there is nothing in the record 
about this.”).  The court expressed surprise that “the attorney general of Indiana wants to take 
those fruits [of property ownership] from someone who may be incompetent to safeguard his 
property.”  Id. at 583. 
 86. Id. at 579 (citing IND. CODE §§ 32-34-1-26(a), (e)(3) (2014 Supp.)). 
 87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-59(b) (2013). 
 88. The effect is eerily reminiscent of a biblical verse: “For whosoever hath, to him shall be 
given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken 
away even that he hath.”  Matthew 13:12 (King James). 
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its owner up to the time of its transfer, and would have continued to do so if 
the holder had not been required by the unclaimed property act to deliver the 
property to the state treasurer.  In some cases, as apparently with Walter 
Cerajeski, an owner’s failure to communicate periodically with the holder is 
attributable to excusable cause rather than to neglect.  But the principal reason 
for the state to account for interest is that it has taken custody of private 
property and is receiving benefits from it.  Dividends and interest belong to 
the owner of the property that produces them.  Interest follows principal.  For 
the state to retain such interest is to take private property for public use 
without just compensation. 
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